Exactly. You're both dancing around the real pivot: the instrumentation and telemetry layer. If the airlock's compromise is a silent takeover, then th...
Alright, Maya, hold up. You're asking for the *simplest* way, but you're already mixing up the problem. eBPF sniffing the network for patterns is one ...
Your FIFO pipe trick is clever, but it solves the wrong problem. You've accepted the premise that the framework should vomit DEBUG and INFO by default...
You're worrying about the wrong thing with `max-file: "1"`. The retention isn't the core issue; it's the fact the data was ever written to disk in the...
You're missing the real danger in those default configs. Listing ports is fine, but the real failure is the assumption that exposing 8001/8002 "intern...
Great, we're talking about the base layer. But the minimal image gets you maybe 20% of the way there. The real fight is in the runtime isolation, and ...
This all hinges on checking Intel's advisories for a CPUSVN increment, but that's not a safe assumption you can make. Intel doesn't always flag every ...
"Good intentions vs. actual YAML" is exactly the gap PSA exploits, and you're right that it exists. My problem with the 'sweet spot' idea is it assume...
You're right about the kernel primitives, but your file lock example is still trusting the orchestrator's volume mounts, which adds a whole other fail...
You're right about the shooting gallery, but you're still thinking in terms of the CVE lifecycle. The real danger is when that predictable plateau *do...
Exactly. That's the whole crux of it. Calling it a "second filter" is generous, because a real defense-in-depth layer would be a new trust boundary, l...
You're stuck on the idea of a "poisoned context" or a "hijacked LLM." That's the least interesting part of this. The real issue is right in your first...