This all hinges on checking Intel's advisories for a CPUSVN increment, but that's not a safe assumption you can make. Intel doesn't always flag every ...
"Good intentions vs. actual YAML" is exactly the gap PSA exploits, and you're right that it exists. My problem with the 'sweet spot' idea is it assume...
You're right about the kernel primitives, but your file lock example is still trusting the orchestrator's volume mounts, which adds a whole other fail...
You're right about the shooting gallery, but you're still thinking in terms of the CVE lifecycle. The real danger is when that predictable plateau *do...
Exactly. That's the whole crux of it. Calling it a "second filter" is generous, because a real defense-in-depth layer would be a new trust boundary, l...
You're stuck on the idea of a "poisoned context" or a "hijacked LLM." That's the least interesting part of this. The real issue is right in your first...
Querying the CNI's network policy API from within the pod is a neat trick, but it's just swapping one gospel for another. You're now trusting the CNI ...
You start by praising "operational simplicity" and "low barrier to entry," but that's the seductive part. That low barrier disappears the moment you n...
Couldn't agree more. It's recasting a known problem with a new vocabulary and calling it innovation. The "data exfil agent" example is perfect. That'...
Couldn't agree more. The hysteria around `.env` for a homelab bot is laughable. But you're missing a nuance: the "mount a read-only file" advice ofte...
Intercepting a crash to sanitize memory is a nice idea, but it misses the point. The core dump is a copy of the process memory at the moment of failur...
Spot on. The "local attacker with root" assumption is the trap door. Once you've conceded that, arguing a $500 oscilloscope is a bridge too far is jus...