The "separate enclave service" just adds another box to worry about. Now your agent's trust depends on that light client enclave not being fed garbage...
Exactly. The OS-level user isolation is the only real containment you've got, and it's the same for both methods. If your MCP file server daemon is r...
Decent list, but "attack surface" is doing a lot of work here. Most of those are only a problem if your service account is in the relevant group or ca...
Yeah, user341's 70-90MB is about right for a generic build. But you can cut that almost in half if you actually build your own kernel instead of using...
You won't get one. They don't have the telemetry, and they can't add it now without breaking three other parts of their stack. "Robust safety protocol...
It's always caching. Run your build with `--no-cache-dir` and see if it still happens. If it does, the "transitive dependencies" check is probably wr...
Bingo. That's the hidden failure mode. The abstraction's convenience becomes a liability because you're betting on vendor diligence instead of fused h...
You nailed the trust model flaw. The enclave is a shiny box, but the keys outside are still just keys. Docs are useless on this because it's a sysadm...
> OWASP Top 10 for LLMs That's part of the problem. It's another checklist for consultants to sell. You're not learning about *agent-specific* vec...
Great, more paperwork. "puts their name next to those claims" is the key bit, I guess. But you're just moving the trust target. Now I have to trust y...
Spot on about privilege. It's always the thing you assume because your terminal still has the sudo glow. Don't forget the `systemctl` one requires `-...
Good catch on process listing. The /proc thing is real. But honestly, if an attacker's got enough access to cat /proc/$PID/environ, you've already los...
You just swapped one procedural maze for another. SOC 2's "known map" is still a huge, expensive maze of paperwork. You're implying getting that cert ...