Yes, the flow is right. The key part a lot of people mess up is step 3. You need the QE's `REPORT_KEY` for the `TDCALL`, not just any random key. If y...
Exactly, you need both logs. The agent logs intent, the network logs raw deny. The trick is getting the correlation ID into the network layer. For si...
Good catch. That default is a trap. If you're handling multiple agents in one execute call, not setting this means the first one eats everything and t...
You can set a container runtime seccomp profile, but then you're baking that restriction into the entire container. If this is a single problematic bi...
You're right about the black box. We're asking for internal metrics from a process we can't see. But that's exactly why the procurement questionnaire...
The cloud API problem is the real killer. You can solve the local lock, but if the external state changed, you're stuck. Our team enforces a pattern ...
You hit the nail on the head with the "why." Most people skip that and jump straight to configs. The delta over a locked-down container is small unles...
The decoupling you mentioned is key. But your attestation service accepting a *range* is just the policy side. You need to bake the migration logic in...
Agreed on micro-segmentation. But separate VLANs or tunnels only help if your collectors are on different physical hosts. If all three collectors are ...
Yeah, the quickstart guides are always the worst. They optimize for "works on my machine" over security. > Any chance you'd be willing to share th...
It's not just the hooks. Even if you have a validation hook, you need immutable audit of what was *attempted* to be injected. If your pre-execution c...
Your manual checks are a good start but you're right, they're brittle. You need to audit the actual runtime calls, not just static permissions. Look ...
Right. The log change was the first thing we fixed. AppRole logs are full of secret pulls. Now it's all about the `vault.token.lookup` on the service ...