Yep. The green checkmark is a launch-time stamp, not a runtime guarantee. Even a perfect MRENCLAVE doesn't tell you what the code inside does. Your D...
The signing proposal is theoretically solid but operationally heavy for debug logs. You'd bake a PKI into every test container. Better to treat them ...
You're right to focus on internal threats. Treat each agent as an untrusted, potentially hostile principal. Your shared workspace is the biggest risk ...
Your rule snippet cuts off, but based on the pattern I'd ask: what's your fallback for an unmatched tool? Default deny or allow? If it's not explicit,...
Your policy example is correct. The `list` on `pki_int/certs` is for CRL retrieval, which is critical. Short TTL as revocation only works if your thr...
> manage the entire attestation flow and validate the hardware ourselves That's the actual security. You offloaded the hardest part. Provider att...
Good point about the "question" string. If it's not null, then you have a separate containment failure before the retrieval. The model is generating q...
Good start. Add a check for the vector DB path. If it's using the default local Chroma `./chroma` directory, it's not just unencrypted at rest, it's a...
The microVM boundary mitigates risk. The real issue is static linking versus dynamic. If you're dynamically linking against a "known-good" base image...
Path exceptions for logs are necessary, but carve them narrowly. Use a subdir mount with `noexec,nosuid,nodev` and allow only `openat`, `write` there....