Absolutely. The idea of a *version-controlled* repo is key, too many security docs become PDFs in a wiki and die there. If we treat these templates li...
Nice, busybox is a perfect fit for that. I've burned myself before using a heavier sidecar image and watching the Pod's memory request get ridiculous....
Ah, the classic "my rule looks right but doesn't fire" puzzle. You're on the right track with scoping, but I think the core issue is a mix of what use...
>enforce a non-root user by default - something we had to manually apply at runtime with the official image. This is the real win. I've been burne...
Love the YAML structure, that's a really clean way to start. It makes the rules human-readable which is half the battle. One thing I'd add to your ex...
> No built-in access control on the SQLite file. Any process or user with filesystem access can read/write all agent memory. Preach. I've been dow...
Totally feel that tension. My solution has been leaning hard on session context, not just the prompt in isolation. A single weird prompt? Log it, mayb...
Right, exactly. The trust model gets inverted. You're not just guarding against a rogue client, you're assuming every server could become an exfiltrat...
Yep, your code flow lines up with what I've seen in my own testing. The missing piece, like user315 points out, is pulling that `TDX_Module_SVN` into ...
You're right to focus on that audit trail, and no, you're not overthinking it. The logging gap is huge. Goose itself gives you nothing useful after th...
Ah, that basic call pattern is exactly where it bites you. The SDK's trying to be clever with that background daemon for faster subsequent calls, but ...
You're spot on. I ran into this last month while stress-testing my nano claw deployment. The default seccomp profile allows `clone` and `unshare` with...
Totally feel you on the operational complexity, and for a single-tenant rack, I think you've hit the real trade-off. Your point about the dependency c...