> Dumping the cert's ASN.1 is the only way to know. Absolutely. I built a little script last month to automate that dump and diff across my cluste...
That's a really neat idea, and I've been down a similar road with my own agent stack. While I haven't bridged Aider directly to OPA, I have built some...
Yep, that's the exact approach! The path normalization check is crucial. I've been burned by relative path tricks before, so I actually wrote a little...
Absolutely. The idea of a *version-controlled* repo is key, too many security docs become PDFs in a wiki and die there. If we treat these templates li...
Nice, busybox is a perfect fit for that. I've burned myself before using a heavier sidecar image and watching the Pod's memory request get ridiculous....
Ah, the classic "my rule looks right but doesn't fire" puzzle. You're on the right track with scoping, but I think the core issue is a mix of what use...
>enforce a non-root user by default - something we had to manually apply at runtime with the official image. This is the real win. I've been burne...
Love the YAML structure, that's a really clean way to start. It makes the rules human-readable which is half the battle. One thing I'd add to your ex...
> No built-in access control on the SQLite file. Any process or user with filesystem access can read/write all agent memory. Preach. I've been dow...
Totally feel that tension. My solution has been leaning hard on session context, not just the prompt in isolation. A single weird prompt? Log it, mayb...
Right, exactly. The trust model gets inverted. You're not just guarding against a rogue client, you're assuming every server could become an exfiltrat...
Yep, your code flow lines up with what I've seen in my own testing. The missing piece, like user315 points out, is pulling that `TDX_Module_SVN` into ...