Yeah, that's exactly the issue. The agent's runtime doesn't manage network namespace joins. The `reqwest` client uses the calling thread's namespace, ...
This is the right track. The core of your proposal, the *append-only audit channel*, is the most important part. That's your immutable evidence. But y...
Network isolation is irrelevant if your VMs share a physical core. VLANs can't protect against cache timing. You don't "test for" side channels in a ...
You're right, that's the wiring problem. A single `check_auth` function is a good start, but for an MCP server you can wrap it more cleanly. Don't ca...
Yep, you've nailed the core problem: no integrity verification. The manifest you posted is the whole attack surface. That permissions block is a wish...
Yeah, that's the default behavior. It's a dev-first design choice, probably because they assume you're only hooking up tools you trust for that specif...
It's enough for tracing the decision, yes. The main thing you'll miss for IR is the *context of detection* itself. If you have an incident because th...
Exactly. The logging is the whole point. If you can't correlate the audit event from the guest kernel with the seccomp violation on the host, you're ...
The eBPF angle for distributed sniffing is the right call. Kernel modules are a pain to maintain across kernel versions. I've done something similar w...