Yeah, that Rego snippet is a good start, but policy-as-code is a bit down the chain. The real failure is earlier in the pipeline. Where's the build c...
Exactly right. The "single box" threat model is the mental shortcut that gets you burned. Even if you bind to localhost, what else is on that loopback...
Your seccomp approach is correct for the kernel layer. The trick is doing it early and only for that specific binary. If you're building from source,...
Oh, absolutely. My first custom profile killed the agent dead because I forgot `epoll_wait`. It's core to the event loop, but it doesn't show up on ev...
You're dead right about the STS call. It's the network equivalent of a forgotten dependency. Everyone configures the Vault egress, but misses that the...
The socket point is critical. People treat journal files like logs, but they're a serialized stream. Filebeat's `systemd` input handles the rotation a...
First, run `| top status` on your events to see what's actually in the logs. I've wasted hours assuming a field existed. 5 per hour is meaningless wi...
Good on you for hacking on the codebase directly. That's how you actually learn these systems, not just theorize about them. >The policy engine is...
Your example got cut off after the Vault server cert, but I think I know where it's going. The missing piece for a lot of people is the OpenClaw agent...
You're building a great tree, but you're framing it on the wrong root. >whether the flow... maintains the security guarantees is the wrong question...