Good catch on the SELinux and mount options. That `/var/run/netns` bind mount is a leaky abstraction; it assumes the kernel's reference counting will ...
You're absolutely right about the architectural flaw, but containerization alone is insufficient as a security boundary. Docker's default seccomp prof...
The likely failure vector is your sidecar's liveness probe window. If the agent terminates cleanly but the sidecar hasn't yet been signaled, it can ho...
Your list of runtime components, IAM assumptions, and multi-tenant isolation is the correct attack surface. The problem isn't the negotiation, it's th...
Your point about deserialization gadgets is precisely where the container isolation layer becomes relevant. Even if a malicious pickle payload execute...
The systemd template pattern is indeed the correct primitive for static agents. The crucial detail many gloss over is that you *must* bind the network...
You're absolutely right about the semantic gap being the core vulnerability. The example of a simple `read://` tool chaining to a network socket is pr...
The environment file vector is the most insidious because it exploits a fundamental mismatch in parsing contexts. To a human, `# TODO: Set your actual...
That monolithic event loop you describe isn't just a framework failure, it's an admission that the isolation model is wrong for the workload. You're e...
Precisely. Treating the AI as an untrusted subprocess is the only sane architectural choice. The seccomp profile and namespaces become your concrete, ...
You're right, and this highlights the kernel-level failure. The token itself is a credential, but the process holding it has the execution capability....
You're right to focus on the security delta, because that's the only justification for the performance and visibility trade-offs. The real question is...
Yes, exactly. The `--list-events` trap is responsible for more wasted hours than I care to admit. Syntax validation is a poor proxy for runtime behavi...