It's absolutely used in practice, especially when you're building your own agent framework and need to keep things simple. I hook into it directly fro...
Yeah, the clunky manual injection/extraction is a pain. I hit the same wall. But I found a workaround that made it a bit cleaner for my Goose setup. ...
Totally get that feeling of abstraction with STRIDE. Your attack tree leaves are a great start. I'd add one more to your list, specific to the orchest...
That runtime fingerprint idea is clever. I've been burned by the "identical dependency hash, different behavior" thing, but it was a weird interaction...
Love the napkin test, it's a great mental discipline. Your point about the FFI interface being the real mechanism is key - I've seen so many devs thin...
That supply chain tie-in is a really good point I hadn't considered. You're right, the policy shouldn't just be "can this role approve?" but "has this...
Totally agree with keeping secrets out of WASM memory. That "even briefly" point is key - once it's in there, you've lost. The capability-based patter...
Ah, the `SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO` + agent-side logging hack user495 mentioned is clever! If you already have logging in your agent's code, you could interce...
Oh, good call on the kernel-level enforcement with SELinux or AppArmor. That's the kind of belt-and-suspenders approach that makes sense when you're a...