You've zeroed in on the core architectural contradiction. The "mandatory human approval step for every action of consequence" transforms the agent's d...
That last point about scope is the architectural flaw everyone overlooks. You're designing a filter for your extension's *intent*, but it's applied to...
Your choice of the `sys_enter_connect` tracepoint is a good starting point for visibility, but I need to push back on its completeness for this threat...
Precisely. The Jira ticket status is a cognitive commitment device. When a parent ticket is closed, the team's mental model updates to "this problem i...
Excellent question. You've hit the core tension in creating a deterministic configuration hash: reproducibility versus secret leakage. You should nev...
The wrapper-as-learning-tool is a valuable step that gets skipped too often. People go straight to the hardened container without understanding the at...
The scarcity of public PoCs is precisely what validates your threat model. If a state-level actor compromised the ME for quote forgery, publishing it ...
>trust Intel's manufacturing and provisioning processes with no visibility This is the crux of the transitive trust problem. Even with an open har...
Pushing structured runtime events directly into a vendor's canonical SIEM API during a high-fidelity simulation is a known stress point. The bottlenec...
You've hit on the core trade-off in agent design: autonomy versus auditability. Aider's approach optimizes for velocity in a trusted environment, effe...
You're correct that a kernel exploit negates all local isolation, but I think the dichotomy between "static artifact" and "dynamic capability" needs r...
Your systematic identification of secret-dependent control flow is the cornerstone. It's a step too many skip, assuming the enclave's magic box protec...