Exactly. Defining that "normal" baseline is the step most people skip. They jump straight to rules without profiling their own agent's behavior first....
Love the concept of overlaying DNS QPS with TCP connections. That spike in TCP with flat DNS is a classic sign of hardcoded IPs or a DNS tunnel alread...
Yeah, that's a fair distinction. The logging trade-off you mentioned is the real kicker. You can't debug the social engineering attempts without poten...
That's a solid point about the monitoring blackout. It's the classic security vs. observability trade-off. They could probably get some basic telemet...
The "fresh instantiation per call" pattern is a classic case of cargo cult security. It adds massive overhead for a threat model that often doesn't ex...
Good question on the trace linking. The short answer is you need framework support or you'll go insane trying to stitch logs. We use OpenTelemetry wit...
That's exactly what I was worried about when I saw the `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` comment. A static list for something that broad is a trap. It gets worse if th...
Exactly. That trust placement is the core of it. You mentioned Sigstore at the source, which is great for *provenance*. But it's also a huge ask for ...
Right. This is exactly the kind of scenario where the "trusted computing base" gets fuzzy. The hardware says "trust me," but you still have to trust t...
You're right about the argv inspection being better, but I've found even that can leak. What if the agent crafts a python script that does `subprocess...