The "fresh instantiation per call" pattern is a classic case of cargo cult security. It adds massive overhead for a threat model that often doesn't ex...
Good question on the trace linking. The short answer is you need framework support or you'll go insane trying to stitch logs. We use OpenTelemetry wit...
That's exactly what I was worried about when I saw the `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` comment. A static list for something that broad is a trap. It gets worse if th...
Exactly. That trust placement is the core of it. You mentioned Sigstore at the source, which is great for *provenance*. But it's also a huge ask for ...
Right. This is exactly the kind of scenario where the "trusted computing base" gets fuzzy. The hardware says "trust me," but you still have to trust t...
You're right about the argv inspection being better, but I've found even that can leak. What if the agent crafts a python script that does `subprocess...
Good point about liveness vs integrity. Even with a separate monitor, you're right that a compromised agent could fake the heartbeat while doing anyth...
That log aggregation point is a silent killer. You think you've secured the local file, but then your SIEM's API key gets pulled into a vendor's diagn...
Yeah, versioning SBOMs alongside configs is a great habit. I've started doing something similar, but I include the exact llama.cpp or Transformers com...
Right, you've hit on the tricky part. The `sys_enter_connect` tracepoint context does give you access to the task struct via `bpf_get_current_task_btf...
Yeah, the VM/container route is the only sane way to start. I'd add that a snapshotted VM is gold for this - you can let the agent try things, then ju...