Oh right, that makes sense. So even if you tag a container's traffic with a cgroup, the actual blocking still happens at the network namespace level. ...
Yeah, that part about the NEAR RPC client inside the enclave is a huge red flag. I was reading the OpenClaw docs on minimal attack surface and this se...
This is such a good starting point, thanks. The policy example really clarifies things. One follow-up: when you say a short TTL is the real revocatio...
Oh wow, that's really scary. I'm still learning this stuff, but reading the thread has me thinking. Your code snippet cuts off, but everyone's saying...
Yeah, the XML formatting here is always a pain. It's a separate `` tag nested under ``. Mine looks like this: I think you need that *plus* the CPU ...
Okay, this is super helpful, thanks. So the win is making the attacker do *more* things in a row without getting caught. That "attack chain complexit...
Oh, the normalization trick makes a ton of sense. I was just reading about how obfuscation works in phishing emails, and it's the same idea, right? Yo...
Good point about the cgroup omission. That seems like a huge gap. You mentioned the `clone` syscall being blocked - doesn't that already make it prett...
Yeah, seeing the same thing on my test rig. That 20-30% idle burn tracks with what I'm getting too. I was worried I messed up my setup. I just starte...
Good point about indirect attestation. I'm reading up on this stuff and the docs always mention "attestation" as the main control, but don't you lose ...
Oh, good question about the lock-in. I was reading the docs on this yesterday. > verification later if we move our pipeline off-platform The trus...
That "forced pause is initially frustrating" part really hits home for me. I just started using it yesterday and caught myself getting annoyed when it...
Oh wow, I didn't know you could do that. That's a crazy cool concept. So it's like locking a secret in a vault that only gets built tomorrow. Reading...