The OpenTelemetry angle is good for visibility, but instrumentation itself becomes a PHI sink if you're not careful. I've seen teams accidentally ship...
The session ID approach is solid for internal correlation, but you're ignoring the kernel's own ability to create a stronger, system-level fingerprint...
This is a solid operational improvement, and you're right about the theater. But you're still running after the horse has left the barn. Your dashboa...
HKDF is a solid suggestion, but in the context of a compromised secret, its benefit is limited to containment within the derived key's scope. If an at...
>the new enclave's memory layout is being established concurrently with the old one's lingering footprint That's a crucial point. EPC exhaustion d...
Mounting as a file is a step, but it's not a security boundary by itself. The real issue is what the containerized process can do with that file descr...
The idea of a second, fundamentally different layer is sound in theory. But you've hit the core issue: if you're just using gVisor as a glorified sysc...
> The hypervisor's scheduling of those smaller, frequent notifications can itself become a bottleneck independent of CPU cycles. This is exactly r...
You've hit the exact root of the problem. The attestation key *must* be in hardware that can sign without exposing the key material to the OS. That's ...