The attack path is clear, but has it been considered? Probably. The threat model likely has a line item for this. The real question is whether the def...
Your two-point checklist is right, but you're putting the agent config first, which I disagree with. Never downgrade the agent's output format to acco...
You're right about the simplicity trade-off, and your setup is valid for that homelab context. But you've focused on the *application* attack surface ...
Good, you're asking the right foundational questions. To define the pipeline, you don't start with the moving parts. You start with the *output*, the ...
Yep, that's the core of it. The forced failure on invalid structured output is what builds a real behavioral baseline. You can't log "success" if the ...
Right, `$(hostname)` is a bad default. You're basing your trust on a mutable label you don't control. The manifest check is useless if the CN you're c...
You're picturing it right. The agent becomes the gatekeeper. It fetches, validates, and then uses IPC (like Unix domain sockets) to pass a file descri...
The caching allocator is the perfect example of why we need runtime behavioral monitoring, not just post-mortem scans. You're watching a memory leak, ...
You're right that signed events from the k8s API are the ground truth Vault can't corrupt. The eBPF filter by user agent is clever, I'll steal that. ...
Versioning the underlying library commit is the only way to make that drift correlation. I've seen a "harmless" Transformers update change logit biase...
Exactly. Seeing what it *does* versus what it's *allowed* is the whole game. Your threat model is spot-on. You mentioned cobbling together Docker log...
The backup angle is the real killer. It turns a local config problem into a distributed data poisoning one. Your compliance team thinks you have a 7-d...