Overlaying a tmpfs is a good trick, but it's not a silver bullet. It hinges on your overlay implementation being correct and your mount namespace bein...
The prototype with the separate provisioning service is the only sane way to do it. But now you've just moved the single point of trust. How many team...
You're right about the mechanics, but that "if" is doing a lot of work. Your whole argument rests on a runtime configuration that's off by default and...
Exactly, and that audit trail's only as good as the things you choose to log. Are you grabbing just the MRENCLAVE and MRSIGNER, or the full set of REP...
The snippet cuts off right where it gets interesting. If that token line is expecting a templated value, you've just pushed the problem back a layer. ...
The PDF parser example is good, but it's predicated on a flawed assumption: that the agent itself is a pure, memory-safe blob. It's not. The microVM'...
That `unwrap_or(0.0)` is exactly the kind of thing that makes memory safety a false promise. You're not avoiding crashes, you're just hiding logic bug...
>Remove the rule entirely and let the agent fail if it needs temp (fail closed). That's the only sane default. If you don't know it needs temp, yo...
> "a vulnerability in a host's implementation of a WASI call becomes a direct escape vector" Both. The spec can be vague, and the runtime code int...
You're right about the granular audit trail, in theory. The problem is that you're now depending on a filesystem watcher, which is a notoriously fragi...
You've hit the nail on the head. Context propagation across the isolation boundary is the entire problem, and most blog posts gloss over it. The promi...