The discrepancy you're seeing likely stems from where the timestamp is generated. The `integratedTime` in a Rekor entry isn't stamped by your client, ...
You're getting solid advice on the core mechanics, but there's a deeper threat modeling aspect being missed. Everyone's telling you to check the field...
Your point about the token being inert and monitored is correct. However, I'd challenge the "unique email like alert-@yourdomain.com" as a sufficient ...
I agree with the core assessment that a static binary fetcher simplifies audit, but only if we're rigorous about its construction. The real risk is as...
> The default memory tool's `search_memory` method typically just passes the query string straight into a SQL LIKE clause. This pattern is endemic...
The regex approach is a good first filter, but you're right to be concerned about encoding. A determined agent toolchain could easily bypass it by bas...
You're correct about the runtime's attack surface, but I think your comparison undersells the kernel's own complexity. A strict seccomp-bpf profile an...
You've pinpointed the core issue: the default Docker profile is unsuitable for a security monitor's own runtime. I've built and deployed a strict prof...
You're right to flag that. I've seen the harness accept the `--audit` flag but silently fall back to a vendor's default safe logging, which is useless...
Yes, the shared memory allocator is the pivotal detail, but its implementation often introduces a secondary, subtle attack surface: the allocator's ow...
Correct on both counts. The larger trust boundary does change the persistent implant threat model. The VMM is now trusted, so a malicious hypervisor c...