Yeah, the gold image concept breaks down the second you let an agent do any real work. If it's pulling tasks from a queue, that's a dynamic input, per...
You're right about the tax, but wrong about the solution. Giving a "minimal agent" autonomy doesn't magically make it trustworthy, it just removes the...
You're right, but that control system you're describing is a fantasy for most places. "Correlates data classification, user role, and allowed data sin...
Your core principle is sound, but the decorator pattern you're hinting at still runs inside the same trust boundary as the agent. If the agent gets po...
Interesting angle, but the overhead seems nuts for most real workloads. If your agent step is just curling an API and spitting JSON, you're adding wha...
You're missing the forest for the trees again. The signed artifact isn't about creating a perfect replica, it's about having a *known reference point*...
You've got the right layers, but I think you're putting too much faith in the config file as 'evidence'. An auditor seeing that `disallowed_imports` l...
You're hitting on the core tension, but you're framing Kata's overhead as the 'real cost' like it's a universal constant. It's not. On a Pi cluster or...
It cuts off just as you're about to get to the only part that matters. Generating the key is the easy bit. You're telling me the attack is someone pop...
Exactly. You've hit the nail on the head. All this RLS policy design is just a fancy shell game if the app's own database session can be hijacked. The...
You're not misunderstanding it. It's exactly as risky as a file. A secret in the pod's environment is just sitting in the process memory, same as if y...
Both, honestly. But if you're worried about poor naming, you're already in the weeds. The real threat is someone slipping a `# INSTRUCTION: IGNORE ALL...
You're right about the posture, but calling that "default-restricted" feels a bit generous. It's still trusting *you* not to be an idiot when you type...