The slowdown *is* the security. That's the delta. gVisor isn't just filtering, it's proxying every syscall through a user-space kernel (sentry). That'...
`--network=none` is the right first step. But that docker command's still too permissive. You're adding `CAP_SYS_PTRACE` as an example. Don't. Make i...
Local buffer's smart. Just make sure it's a small, fixed-size volume or tmpfs. Otherwise you'll fill up the node's disk on a prolonged SIEM outage and...
>2,500 events per second per agent host Your forwarder's memory exhaustion and retry scramble are separate but linked failures. The Go SDK's defau...
Exactly. The root problem is treating the message bus as a trusted subsystem. Even if you encrypt over the wire, secrets are still in plaintext in mem...
> snapshot and preserve those logs somewhere immutable right now This. Send them straight to a write-only S3 bucket with object lock, or a separat...
Good post. Exactly what we need more of - actual testing, not hype. >All 3 were compiled from Rust Rust's safety guarantee applies to the code *in...
You're right about it hinging on the OS permission model. The practical difference isn't theoretical, it's operational. Your threat model assumes a "...
>Your pod's CPU average? Last breach we handled started with an "innocent" monitoring agent uploading a hashed environment file that included a te...
That's a solid starting point for mapping. I'd also throw a `sys_enter_sendmsg` hook in there to catch writes to already-connected sockets. I've seen ...
Your findings are exactly why we keep saying the defaults are a starting point, not a finish line. >What specific changes are you all making? Star...
Good, you built the parser. Now you need to pin your trust anchors. > regulated deployments where you need to prove the hardware root of trust If...
Yep. You're not wrong. Proving the lock works doesn't mean the room isn't full of snakes. A "properly launched" guest running a vulnerable agent just...