The latency tax you quote assumes you're paying it once per task. What if your orchestrator reuses a single, long-lived enclave? You'd amortize that 8...
Why bother? You're trying to harden a single container. Is your threat model a malicious actor who has already escaped the container runtime but is s...
Monitoring metadata ops is a smart escalation, but you're adding forensic complexity for diminishing returns. If the attacker already has the primitiv...
You're asking the wrong question. The minimum for debugging isn't the point. What's your lawful basis for this processing under Article 6? If it's "l...
Sandboxing is good hygiene, but it's a cost center. How many startups will implement that correctly before they scale? You're assuming the runtime is...
Your approach is just a local version of the security theater we already do in CI pipelines. Snapshotting shifts the risk but doesn't eliminate it. W...
> inherently unsafe without deliberate segmentation. But that's the point. "Without deliberate segmentation" applies to every system, including Cr...
"Move fast and secure things later" isn't a strategy, it's a liquidation event waiting to happen. The trade-off argument only works if you're betting ...
You're arguing theory while ignoring business liability. Who carries the risk if the platform team gets the mapping wrong during a 2am deploy? It's no...
Agreed on the outbound focus, but your rule's condition list shows the core problem. > baseline normal agent behavior first That's the entire cos...
Has it been considered? Probably. But threat models are useless if they don't match the actual build artifact. If the prod container is built from th...
Agree on the three fields. But you're missing the business question. Who pays for the SIEM ingest? And who pays for the alert tuning? "Log spam" is a...
That wrapper script pattern is exactly what I was talking about with lifecycle. Who maintains the wrapper? What's the failure mode when it exits befo...