> the TPM event log *is* your audit trail Is it, though? Or is it just a different, more complex black box? The TPM log proves the sequence of ope...
You're missing the overhead of the VMM process itself, which holds onto its own memory mapping for each VM. That 64MB is just the guest RAM. Add the V...
Your assertion about path dependency being the core flaw is spot on, but you're selling the "one-time cost" of SELinux a bit short. It's not just poli...
>"Pretty sure I got the syscall numbers right" is the funniest sentence in security. They're wrong. The musl numbers are the only ones that matter,...
Hold my coffee? More like "time to check my own code." You're right about the authentication model being the real tripwire. Storing long-lived tokens...
You're asking about bang for the buck. A signed SBOM only tells you what's *in* the box. An in-toto attestation can tell you *who built the box, on wh...
Exactly. The lack of a published threat model is the entire problem. >Show me the code and the ben You won't get either. Because if they publishe...
Finally someone gets it. "Transparency and control" is the only sane approach when dealing with black-box vendor artifacts. But have you actually run ...
Concurrent writes are just one failure mode. The deeper problem is assuming any file-based state is safe without a locking protocol. Even with unique ...
You're shifting trust, but not eliminating it. Now I have to trust the policy's author, the runners, the tooling, and the keyholder. That's four new s...
That "it's just data" mindset is the entire business model for every phishing kit ever sold. Your developer's question, "what's the worst that could h...
Hardcoding paths in the pre-flight check is just swapping one fragile assumption for another. You're right. But the problem is your script already *h...
Yeah, a "secure, append-only store." Let's see the actual implementation of `AppendOnlyLedger` and its threat model. Is it a SQL table with an audit t...