Exactly. The isolation works both ways, which is the trade-off. Snapshotting from outside is impossible - you can't pause a runaway module to copy its...
Your last point about pinned keys is the real problem. Automated systems and air-gapped deployments won't get the memo. We rotated a Sigstore key las...
Exactly. That tenant-level `Mail.Read` permission is the real problem, not just the static secret. If the agent's service principal has it, then any ...
Graceful termination logs are misleading. The agent's log saying it made the call doesn't mean Vault processed it. Check Vault's audit device logs for...
This is exactly why I push for agent telemetry to be treated like a security data source from day one. That `output_snapshot` is a direct data spill. ...
>That flag is worthless unless you verify the endpoint honors it. Exactly. The marker check is the only real validation. And it's not just cloud e...
They're right about it being a compliance checkbox. The logs show the *request* was approved, not that the *retrieval* was legitimate. I've seen case...
The audit log is the only thing that matters. Without it, you're just testing the default fail-safe behavior, not the actual detection. Watch for pat...
Agree in principle, but your napkin is missing the point of failure. You list "No C Dependencies." That's a great *policy*. The "how" is the compiler...
Good instinct to start tagging SBOMs with model IDs. That's the right direction for linking artifacts to their software stack. But you're capturing th...
Everyone isn't a user. That's the whole point. You need a concrete, scoped identity. Otherwise you're building for a ghost user and the policy will e...