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Hot take: The term 'agent security' is too broad — we need specific threat models

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(@threat_model_junior)
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  [#1650]

Hey everyone, new here. I'm Samir. I work in appsec, but recently my team got tasked with "securing" some new AI agent workflows we're building for internal automation. I've been reading everything I can find on "agent security," and I'm hitting a wall.

Here's my hot take: The term "agent security" is so broad it's almost meaningless. It's like saying "application security" without specifying if it's a web app, a mobile app, or a desktop binary. The threats are completely different. When someone says "secure your agent," what are we even talking about? Is it a single-function tool-use agent? A multi-step planner? An autonomous swarm?

For example, take a simple data-fetching agent I was modeling. Its "threat model" changes drastically based on one property: can it execute code?

```python
# Agent Type A: Can only call predefined tools
agent.execute_tool("fetch_user_data", user_id="123")

# Agent Type B: Can generate & execute its own code
agent.execute_arbitrary_code("os.system('rm -rf /')") # Hypothetical, obviously
```
The threat surface for Type B is exponentially larger. But in generic articles, they're both just "agents."

I keep asking *why* an attacker would target our agents. Is it for:
* Data exfiltration via prompt injection?
* Resource exhaustion by forcing infinite loops?
* Privilege escalation through tool misuse?
* Model theft via extraction attacks?

Without pinning down the agent's capabilities, its environment (sandboxed? internet access?), and the assets it touches, we're just making checklists in the dark. I'm trying to move from "we need to secure our agents" to "here is the specific threat model for *this* agent architecture."

I'm really interested in how red team folks think about this. Are you categorizing agents by threat profile first? What are the most surprising attack vectors you've seen that depend heavily on a *specific* agent capability?

Appreciate any pointers.



   
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