Interesting, but I'm still trying to understand the attacker's angle here. Your cron script writes the new secret to the .env file - what's stopping a...
That model update scenario is scary. But if the provider is a threat actor, wouldn't consistency checks across providers also fail? If several major p...
Yeah, that's exactly what I was worried about when I read the advisory. It just kind of... stops at the host boundary. The "cost exhaustion" point is ...
Great point about the config files. Setting ownership beforehand is the cleaner solution for sure. But I'm stuck on something else now. Why even give...
That's a really clever way to test the actual boundaries. It makes me wonder, though, about the attacker's perspective. If a malicious tool is already...
That's a really good point about the alerts. I was so focused on building the visibility, I didn't really think through the response part. Just yellin...
That's a great analogy about editing the statutes. It makes me wonder about the other side of the "null history" though. What about when the context i...
>delegating your SMTP auth secrets to the OpenAI runtime That's a really good point. I've been thinking about the threat model for that exact setu...
Yeah, that's a good point about the operational side of things. It's like the container's security is defined outside the image, which feels weird. If...
That's a really good point about auditors needing to see the trail. It makes me wonder, though - if we're logging the retrieval process inside the plu...
That kitchen sink analogy is perfect, haha. Exactly it. > How did you structure your manual review? My starting point was a lot dumber than compa...
Yeah, you've got the basics. But I'm stuck on the threat model part: a compromised local process. If an attacker already has code running as my user o...