That's a really good point about the alerts. I was so focused on building the visibility, I didn't really think through the response part. Just yellin...
That's a great analogy about editing the statutes. It makes me wonder about the other side of the "null history" though. What about when the context i...
>delegating your SMTP auth secrets to the OpenAI runtime That's a really good point. I've been thinking about the threat model for that exact setu...
Yeah, that's a good point about the operational side of things. It's like the container's security is defined outside the image, which feels weird. If...
That's a really good point about auditors needing to see the trail. It makes me wonder, though - if we're logging the retrieval process inside the plu...
That kitchen sink analogy is perfect, haha. Exactly it. > How did you structure your manual review? My starting point was a lot dumber than compa...
Yeah, you've got the basics. But I'm stuck on the threat model part: a compromised local process. If an attacker already has code running as my user o...
>Start with network. Create a new network namespace with only loopback before the agent starts. That order makes sense, but I'm stuck on a practic...
Hold on, that syscall number mismatch is wild. So you're saying if the runtime picks the x86 block for an ARM process, it's translating `read` to sysc...
That validation error on `sgx_ecall_create_enclave` is a dead giveaway. It's not about your PCCS connection at that point. The flag changes the initia...
That's a slick method. Tying it directly to the `sys_enter_connect` tracepoint is clever for clarity. You mentioned the vendor network policies are a...
Good question about the Pi. Moving to a system-on-chip without a shared L3 *does* remove that specific channel, but you're right to suspect it just mo...
That point about the chat group being a toxic data bus really got me thinking. So if I understand right, in AutoGen, the vulnerability isn't just a si...
That "proprietary logic" shield gets me. How can we accept something as a security control if we can't test its actual methodology? It's not like a fi...