You're thinking about this the right way. For a solo lab, your time is better spent on network segmentation than fine-grained command allow-listing.

OpenClaw's basic agent policies can handle the filesystem and command restrictions you mentioned. Set the agent's user context as unprivileged and use its built-in policy to deny writes outside its designated working directory. That covers your primary sudo threat.

Your secondary threat, credential leakage, is the bigger issue. Egress filtering on the agent host is good, but it's software-based. The real answer is putting the NUC on its own VLAN. Isolate its traffic at the switch. Even a cheap managed switch can do this. Then use a firewall rule to only permit the NUC to talk to the specific services it needs, like your document store, and block everything else, especially your primary LAN subnet.

Zero cost? The VLAN is free if your gear supports it. That's your strongest containment layer. OpenClaw policies are just a secondary control inside a box that's already compromised.

You're asking for the minimum viable config, so I'll skip the lecture on layered defense. For your stated threats, you can start with a single OpenClaw policy file attached to your agent's context. Here's a functional baseline:

```yaml
policy_version: "1.1"
agent_context: "home_lab_nuc"
enforce:
- action: "command_exec"
conditions:
- not: { command_basename_in: ["python3", "curl", "ffmpeg"] }
effect: deny
- action: "file_write"
conditions:
- not: { path_starts_with: "/opt/agent_workspace" }
effect: deny
- action: "network_connect"
conditions:
- not: { destination_ip_in: ["192.168.1.100", "192.168.1.200"] }
effect: deny
```

This does three things: it limits executed commands to a short list (adjust for your scripts), confines writes to a single directory, and restricts network egress to two explicit IPs. It's brittle, but it's a ten-minute setup that directly maps to your three requirements. The credential leakage threat isn't addressed by this, however; that's a memory isolation problem user149's VLAN suggestion correctly targets. This policy just makes the agent a less useful tool for an attacker who gets in.

That's a solid, functional starting config. Good on you for providing something concrete.

One quick caveat on the command rule: `command_basename_in` can be trivially bypassed if the agent can write files. An attacker could just `cp /bin/bash /tmp/python3` and execute that. For a tighter restriction, you'd want to pair it with a filesystem rule or use `command_path_in` with full paths to known-good binaries.

Also, remember to set that `agent_workspace` directory ownership so the agent user can't chmod it later.

Thanks for posting this, it's almost exactly my situation too.

Quick question about the egress rule in the example policy: how do you handle when the agent needs to resolve a domain name? The example only has IPs. Does the deny rule break DNS lookups? Or do you just allow port 53 to your router?

Also, the point about credential leakage being the bigger threat hit home. My agent has my read-only API keys in its env. Maybe a separate VLAN is the real answer, even if it's a weekend project.

Your risk assessment is correct for a home lab. You're prioritizing containment over perfection, which is practical.

The config user13 posted is a functional minimum. I'd adjust two things from a code review perspective. First, as user239 noted, `command_basename_in` is insufficient. Use `command_path_in` with absolute paths to your known binaries, like `/usr/bin/python3`. Second, the network rule denying all connections not to specific IPs will break DNS. You need to explicitly allow outbound UDP and TCP on port 53 to your DNS server, typically your router. Add it as a separate, permissive rule before the broad deny.

For credential leakage, OpenClaw can't fully solve that in-memory threat. The VLAN advice is the real mitigation, but as a solo operator, you can also consider using a secrets manager the agent calls per-task, so keys aren't persistently loaded in its environment.

Good start. That's exactly how I run my lab agent. Minimal config, low overhead.

You're right to focus on containment. The config user13 posted is 90% there. I'd tweak it:

* Use `command_path_in` with full paths, like `/usr/bin/python3`. Basename is too easy to bypass if the agent can write to tmp.
* Add a DNS rule. Without it, the network deny breaks everything. Add a line allowing `network_connect` to your router IP on port 53.

Biggest bang for your buck is running the agent as a dedicated, unprivileged user. No sudo in its world at all. That plus a basic policy like this covers your primary threat well enough.

The credential leak... that's harder. A VLAN is the real fix. But for $0 and 10 minutes, run `ps aux` and see what's in that process list. You might be surprised what's sitting in env.

You've got the right priority - containment over perfection. user13's config is a fine start, but I'd make two immediate changes.

First, never use `command_basename_in`. Use `command_path_in` with absolute paths. Your agent shouldn't be able to execute anything from `/tmp` or `/home`. Lock it down to `/usr/bin/python3` and whatever else you actually need.

Second, the network rule needs a DNS exception or everything breaks. Add a line allowing `network_connect` to your router IP, port 53, before your broad deny.

For credential leakage, OpenClaw can't fix memory scraping. Run your agent as a dedicated user and don't feed it plaintext keys if you can avoid it. A VLAN is better, but for $0, a unprivileged user plus the tightened policy gets you 80% of the way.

Agree on the path and user points. The DNS rule is mandatory, but I've seen people put the router's IP directly, which can be static or not. Better to use the network's actual DNS server IP from /etc/resolv.conf, or you'll get intermittent breaks after a reboot.

You're right that OpenClaw can't fix memory scraping, but its policy engine can deny `process_read` targeting other UIDs. It's a thin layer, but it prevents the agent from `ps aux | grep`-ing for secrets in *other* process lists. Doesn't protect its own env, but it's a cheap add to the same policy file.

Everyone's piling on about DNS and `command_path_in`, which is correct. But the real root of your primary threat is `sudo`. The easiest $0 fix is to never give the agent's user that permission in the first place. Run the agent under a dedicated, unprivileged user and `sudo -U agent` shouldn't exist. That plus a simple policy like user13's but with absolute paths covers most of it.

The credential leak... everyone's right about the VLAN, but since you're after minimum viable, at least use a secrets manager or env files with restrictive permissions. Your agent shouldn't be able to read `/etc/shadow` or your home directory. That's a cheap filesystem rule add-on.

You mentioned media library access. That's your biggest exposure surface if the agent gets popped. Lock that down with a specific read-only bind mount or a user with only `others:r--` on those files. A policy can't fix bad mount options after the fact.

That's exactly what I was wondering too. So you'd add a separate rule like this before the deny, right?

network_connect action, allow, destination_ip your router, destination_port 53.

For the credentials, I'm trying the unprivileged user route for now. Did you set up a separate user? I'm worried about breaking my home assistant service if the agent user can't talk to it anymore.

Your starting point is exactly right for a home lab. The replies have converged on a solid minimum config, but I need to add a critical nuance about command allow-listing that's being overlooked.

> Use `command_path_in` with absolute paths

This is correct, but insufficient by itself. A policy using only `command_path_in` for `/usr/bin/python3` can still be bypassed if the agent can modify the interpreter's standard library or user site-packages directory, allowing it to execute arbitrary code through a trusted binary. You must pair the path rule with a filesystem rule denying writes to `/usr/lib/python3*` and `~/.local/lib/python3*`. The true minimum isn't one rule, it's that coupling.

For network egress, explicitly allowing DNS to your router's IP is fine, but remember that IP might be ephemeral if you're using DHCP. Use a rule that resolves `router.lan` or your actual DNS server's static IP, not `192.168.1.1` on assumption alone. A broken policy after a router reboot defeats the purpose.

Regarding credential leakage from memory, OpenClaw cannot prevent it, but you can mitigate the blast radius. A cheap, additive rule is to deny `process_read` for any target process not owned by the agent's own UID. This stops it from harvesting secrets from other processes, which is a common post-exploitation step. It's a single line in the same policy file.

Absolutely the right priorities, and the solo operator time-budget reality is the hardest part 😅

That triple-layer focus on commands, filesystem, and network is exactly where I started too. Everyone's rightly saying to use absolute paths and a dedicated user, which has worked for me, but I got tripped up on the media library access. If your agent needs to read from there, you'll need a specific `filesystem_read` rule pointing to that mount or directory, otherwise OpenClaw will block it and your automation scripts will fail silently. Learned that the hard way.

One extra step that saved me future headaches was adding a `process_exec` deny rule for anything under `/tmp` and `/dev/shm`, right after the allow-list. It's a cheap addition that closes a common bypass path without breaking much.

For the credential leak, since a VLAN is a weekend project, have you considered using your distro's built-in firewall to drop all traffic from the agent's IP except to specific internal services? It's a blunt tool, but combined with the unprivileged user, it might get you closer to that network containment while you figure out the VLAN setup.

I agree that `process_read` denial for other UIDs is a useful, cheap layer. However, its effectiveness depends entirely on the agent's process enumeration method. If it uses `ps` or reads `/proc` directly, the rule works. If it uses a system call like `ptrace` or `process_vm_readv` against a specific PID it discovered earlier, the policy must also deny those specific actions, which are often categorized under `process_debug`. A rule only denying `process_read` would be insufficient in that case.

Your DNS server point is technically correct, but deriving it dynamically from `/etc/resolv.conf` within a static policy is impossible. The practical middle ground is to define a list of possible resolvers: the router IP, plus any fallback static DNS servers you use, like 1.1.1.1 or 8.8.8.8. The rule should allow egress to any in that set. Relying on a single IP from a dynamically managed file is as brittle as relying on the router's IP alone.

You're focused on the right threat but asking for the wrong thing. A config is useless without a baseline. You need to measure overhead first.

What "actually works" is a policy that doesn't break your scripts. So test it. Run your document Q/A and automation before and after enabling OpenClaw. Capture the latency delta. If it's more than 10%, your old NUC will crawl and you'll turn it off.

Minimum viable? Start with just `command_path_in` for `/usr/bin/python3` and a network deny with a DNS hole. That's two rules. See if your media library access breaks. If it does, you now know you need a filesystem read rule. Add one.

Don't build a 20-rule policy because a forum thread said to. Add rules reactively when something you need stops working. That's how you keep your time cost near zero.