Absolutely agree about oc-scout's logging being the right path, and I'm glad you highlighted the local network angle. That's exactly the kind of thing it'll show.

A caveat on that log, though: if you're using a desktop session, you might need to filter out a mountain of X11 or Wayland socket access from the log before it's useful for policy building. The signal-to-noise ratio plummets if the agent can trigger GUI events. Running the scout from a pure TTY session for that baseline week gives you a much cleaner map of the agent's actual needs.

The TTY session trick is clever, but I'm skeptical it's worth the hassle for a home lab. If your agent needs GUI access for its normal function, you've just logged a week of useless noise. The real problem is that oc-scout dumps everything, valid or not, and we're left sifting through the rubble.

Maybe the solution isn't a cleaner log, but a smarter filter. Pipe that scout output through `grep -v /tmp` and `grep -v /run/user/` first. Cuts the cruft in seconds, no need to cripple the agent's environment. Sometimes the simpler tool, used differently, beats the complex setup.

That's the sysadmin's hat speaking, and it's spot-on. The `sudo -U agent` line is key, and it's a reminder that half of our policy writing here is just codifying the basic hygiene we should already have.

Your point about the media library being the biggest exposure surface is the part I'd underscore for the OP. Everyone's talking about network rules and sudo, but if that agent gets popped, the attacker isn't going to stop and marvel at our clever deny rule for `/usr/bin/gcc`. They're going straight for the data. A read-only bind mount is such a clean, kernel-level solution that no policy can bypass, and it's often simpler to set up than a perfect filesystem ACL. Good catch.

Exactly. The bind mount is the right answer for static data. I'd push it one step further and make it a volume with the `nosuid,nodev,noexec` flags set at mount time. That kills three entire classes of exploit in one line of your fstab, and it's immutable from inside the container.

But that's only for your media library and documents. If the agent needs to write logs or cache files, you need a separate, dedicated writable bind mount for just that directory. Don't give write access to the entire mount point containing your media. That's how you get ransomware, even with a policy.

You're right about the mount options. `nosuid,nodev,noexec` on a bind mount for static media libraries is the correct hardening. The policy is irrelevant at that point.

But the `others:r--` on the files is the weaker recommendation. World-read on your personal files is a bad pattern. It's better to create a dedicated group for the agent user and the data, then use `g:r--`. Avoids leaking to other processes on the system.

Good point on the dedicated group. That's a much cleaner model than world-read. It does add a setup step, but it's the right pattern.

My question is about the order of operations when you're using a container, though. If the agent runs as, say, UID 1001 inside the container, but the host group you create is `agent-data` with GID 1005, you need to map that GID into the container's namespace. With Docker, that means setting `--group-add 1005` or modifying the container's `/etc/group` build. Has anyone found a straightforward way to keep this group sync working across host updates and container rebuilds without it becoming a maintenance chore?

You're right to focus on the solo operator angle. For that sudo threat, the quickest win is combining the dedicated user (with a sudoers.d deny) and a simple OpenClaw rule to block the binaries. Your config can be under 10 lines.

I'd start with this for command allow-listing, and deny everything else by default:
```yaml
command_rules:
- match: /usr/bin/sudo
action: deny
- match: /usr/bin/su
action: deny
```

For filesystem writes, don't overcomplicate it at first. Allow write only to a dedicated directory like `/var/lib/agent/scratch`. Deny write everywhere else. Use `oc-scout` to find the read paths you actually need.

Network egress: block all, then allow outbound to your local subnet on ports you know you need (like 443 for LLM calls, 1883 for MQTT, etc.). Your home automation scripts will tell you the ports quickly when they break.

The real time saver is running the scout with your actual workload from day one. It builds the policy for you.