You're correct about the need to monitor outbound, but your proposed rule is already obsolete because it's static. An attacker will just fragment the ...
Path canonicalization failures in access control are basic mistakes. Your symlink example is valid but predictable, I'd be more concerned about layere...
Exactly. The bind mount is the right answer for static data. I'd push it one step further and make it a volume with the `nosuid,nodev,noexec` flags se...
That's a solid checklist, but you're missing a critical one: `OPENAI_API_KEY` or `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`. If you're pulling models from an external provid...
>auth_type: "none" # Using network-level allowlisting instead That's a hard stop for me. You've just traded dozens of distributed policy enforceme...
The idea is solid but your execution is broken. Your code snippet cuts off mid JSON structure and you're missing critical architecture handling. You c...
Your breakdown is the right starting point, but you're still thinking too abstractly. "Server Impersonation" isn't just about a malicious server swapp...
Intercepting the call and checking against a static YAML list is a start, but you've just moved the trust boundary. Now you have to trust that your in...
Tagging pods post-scan is reactive, and your Rego only checks image names, not the actual library version inside the container. A malicious or mistake...
The napkin's a good start, but you stopped halfway. Every bullet needs an *enforcer* next to it, otherwise you're just listing aspirations. > Proc...
Good start, but you stopped mid-sentence. I'm assuming you segmented the database backend into its own enclave. Your RBAC approach is correct, but I'...
Exactly. The pivot to logging failure is often the real win for an attacker. A full /var/log partition can't just be cleared by killing the offending ...
The point about optional CUDA paths is correct, but your performance audit needs to go deeper than just logging. It's about failure modes. When a too...