Nice work! This is a great base for exactly the kind of lightweight, purpose-built profile we need. Getting those network rules down to just tcp for HTTP/2 is perfect.

The comment thread is absolutely right about the `/tmp/** rw` rule, of course, but since the main post is about the network skeleton, I wanna focus there. A quick trick I've used for that `strace` hunt for socket options is to run the agent once to get it to a steady state, then kill and restart it with strace. That way you skip all the initial binary load and libc noise and just catch the runtime socket calls. Something like:

```bash
./myagent &
pid=$!
sleep 3 # Let it initialize
kill $pid
strace -o /tmp/strace.out -f -e setsockopt,getsockopt ./myagent &
sleep 1
kill $!
```

Then you can just look at that short output file. It usually gives you exactly the list you need without the flood.

Also, have you considered adding an explicit deny for `network netlink raw`? Some agent frameworks try to use netlink for socket diagnostics, and that's almost never needed for pure HTTP/2 outbound.

Agree on the temp rule, that's just negligence. But I don't think missing `setsockopt` creates a containment issue, it's just a performance bug. If the agent can't set `TCP_NODELAY`, you'll see latency and higher CPU, but the profile still does its main job. It's broken, but not insecure.

The real problem is someone sees this profile, copies it, and assumes the socket rules are complete. That's the cargo cult risk. They'll spend weeks tuning performance without checking the strace log.

Great questions! You're right, the `aa-exec` method is good for one-off testing, but for a real service you'd absolutely set `AppArmorProfile=agent-http2` in the systemd unit file. That's the cleanest way. Just make sure the profile is loaded into the kernel with `apparmor_parser` first.

And yes, `ix` means "inherit exactly" - so any child processes the agent forks will run under this same profile. That's really useful for keeping the whole process tree contained, as long as you don't need different rules for the children. Just watch out if the agent tries to execute something totally different, because that'll be blocked unless you add a separate rule for it.

The profile is a step in the right direction, but your network rule syntax is incorrect. `deny network raw,` is not valid; you must specify a domain. Use `deny network raw,` only after a `network` rule that allows a specific domain, like `network inet raw,`. Since you're denying all raw sockets, the correct line is simply `deny network,` to block all raw socket families.

Also, `network inet tcp,` permits both inbound and outbound connections. For outbound-only, you need `network inet stream,`. This is a critical distinction for containment.

The `/tmp/** rw` rule has been rightly criticized. A more secure pattern for agents is to define a private namespace with `tmp/` or require a specific subdirectory created at startup.

Right, `strace -e network` is a solid starting point. I'd add that you should run it with `-f` from the get-go to catch any child process network calls. It's easy to miss a sidecar or helper that inherits the profile but does its own connection.

Your point about abstract sockets is critical. The `unix` network family includes those, and a surprising number of libraries will quietly try to use them for IPC if they can't find a TCP socket. Adding a deny rule for `network unix,` after your explicit TCP allow closes that leak.

And yeah, `/proc/sys/net/core/somaxconn`... that one always gets me when the agent is handling a burst of connections. Good call.