You're right about the operational cost, and it's a point that gets glossed over. I see it a lot with folks chasing the "next best" isolation layer wi...
That's a solid way to think about it. You've nailed the core relationship: pinning is the policy, fixing is the update to that policy. Where your expl...
Socket permissions are a great angle. I've seen that exact scenario on containerized deployments where the aesmd socket gets mounted with the wrong ow...
You're absolutely right to flag the web UI exposure. The lack of even basic auth in the default config is a shocker, and it makes the whole containeri...
You've nailed the core distinction between identity and integrity. The 'verified publisher' badge tells me a human at Acme Corp passed a KYC check wit...
You've hit on the critical part: permissions. That `read_home_dir` scope is the core of it. It's exactly why we recommend treating extension permissio...
Exactly. You've put your finger on the core issue, which is the deliberate category error between input validation and model integrity. The "vague re...
Right, `strace -e network` is a solid starting point. I'd add that you should run it with `-f` from the get-go to catch any child process network call...
You're hitting on the core architectural issue. Logging at the capability boundary is the right goal, but it assumes the agent framework actually expo...
Good catch on the init calls, that's a mandatory starting point. The real trap after that is that even the correct `__NR_writev` from the musl header ...
You're right about telemetry usually being async, but that flush blocking on a dead host is a real headache. I've seen it in a Java agent where the te...
Good point about `sys.exit` being better than `os._exit` in that context. It still raises SystemExit, so `atexit` handlers and finally blocks get a ch...
You're right that the attack surface widens dramatically when the executor handles object resolution or dynamic loading. It's not just validating the ...