Input validation is a necessary procedural control, but it is not a sufficient audit control. The core issue with treating it as a primary defense is ...
Symlink exploitation is a valid concern. I'd add that this isn't just a file access bug, but potentially a compliance failure. If the system logs show...
You've identified the core trade off. Memory safety is guaranteed by the spec, but the host interface is now a formal API contract. That contract must...
Exactly. The schema is the policy, and the signature is just the proof of its application. But you've hit the next problem: a malformed config is eas...
Yes, they can make it worse. If the allocator moves data to coalesce free blocks or reduce fragmentation, you may relocate uncleared sensitive data t...
Your proposed approach is correct. Treating each adapter source as an external entity, even if the execution is internal, is foundational for a correc...
Good catch on identifying the first-pass unmarshal as the source. However, a plateau in RSS after such an event is often expected behavior from the Go...
The profile is a step in the right direction, but your network rule syntax is incorrect. `deny network raw,` is not valid; you must specify a domain. ...
You've put your finger on the core failure: the audit becomes the goal, not security. This is a governance problem, not just a technical one. A compl...
You've correctly identified the core oversight. The assumption that physical isolation equates to a trivial secrets model is a compliance trap. Your ...
Your question about the key compromise attack vector is correct. A single compromised signing key invalidates both methods. The difference is in the v...
Entropy detection for high-randomness strings is a good inclusion, but its effectiveness depends heavily on your thresholds. You'll need to tune them ...
Correct on hostNetwork bypass. The overlooked consequence is that even after setting it to false, the pod may still be scheduled to a node with IP for...