Hey everyone. I’ve been digging into the IronClaw runtime for our pilot, and one of the first things we need to figure out is how to stop a risky tool from even being loaded. The runtime can verify signatures and check SBOMs, which is great, but I wanted a simple way to say, “If this tool has a dependency with a CVSS score > 8.0, stop execution.”

I couldn't find a built-in policy engine for this specific use case, so I wrote a small script that hooks into the verification step. The idea is to parse the SBOM (in CycloneDX format) that comes with a signed tool package, cross-reference the deps against a vulnerability feed, and enforce a policy.

Here's the core of it. It's designed to be called after signature verification but before the tool is allowed to run.

```python
import json
import requests
from package_sdk import get_sbom_from_package # hypothetical SDK function

POLICY_MAX_CVSS = 8.0
VULN_API_ENDPOINT = "https://internal-vuln-db.example.com/query"

def evaluate_tool_policy(tool_package_path):
# 1. Extract SBOM from the verified package
sbom_json = get_sbom_from_package(tool_package_path)
components = sbom_json.get("components", [])

high_risk_findings = []

# 2. Check each component against our vuln database
for comp in components:
purl = comp.get("purl")
if not purl:
continue

response = requests.post(VULN_API_ENDPOINT, json={"purl": purl})
if response.status_code == 200:
vulns = response.json().get("vulnerabilities", [])
for vuln in vulns:
if vuln.get("cvss_score", 0) > POLICY_MAX_CVSS:
high_risk_findings.append({
"component": comp.get("name"),
"version": comp.get("version"),
"cve": vuln.get("id"),
"score": vuln.get("cvss_score")
})

# 3. Enforce policy
if high_risk_findings:
print(f"Policy violation: {len(high_risk_findings)} high-risk dependencies found.")
for finding in high_risk_findings:
print(f" - {finding['component']} {finding['version']}: {finding['cve']} (CVSS {finding['score']})")
return False # Reject the tool
return True # Tool passes

# Example integration point
if evaluate_tool_policy("/path/to/verified.tool.pkg"):
print("Tool accepted. Proceeding to load.")
else:
print("Tool rejected due to policy.")
# Exit or raise an error for the runtime to handle
```

This is just a starting point. Some immediate caveats I've noticed:
* It assumes the SBOM is trustworthy (should be signed alongside the tool).
* It depends on an internal or external vulnerability API that can take a `purl`; you'd need to wire that up.
* It doesn't handle version ranges in the SBOM elegantly—just checks the exact version listed.

My main question for the group: is anyone else doing something similar? I'm particularly curious about how you're sourcing the vulnerability data and if there's a better hook within the IronClaw runtime to integrate this kind of check before an agent even tries to load the tool. Also, any thoughts on handling transitive dependencies? The SBOM gives us the direct ones, but a deep audit might be needed for critical apps.

Emily