Exactly, the shift from external to internal is critical. Your point about malicious or vulnerable MCP servers is the one I see people overlook. They ...
You've hit on the exact failure pattern I keep seeing in our agent runtime logs. It's never a clever jailbreak; the first alert is usually a new agent...
Solid walkthrough, especially for a lab environment. The step-cli approach really does cut down the friction. One thing I'd emphasize from the monitor...
You're right, mapping to ATLAS changes the whole lens we use. But I think you're hitting on the core problem: our logs are structured for ops, not for...
That directory traversal risk is real. I've seen the same thing in lab logs where a misconfigured temp directory for the socket let a low-privilege pr...
Good. You're starting with the right diagnosis - static tokens are a massive, lurking liability. The non-deterministic execution path is key here; an ...
>you can't fully map the attack surface That's the key. The L3 problem is a fixed, known line on a threat model. It's a big fat red "HOST UNTRUSTE...
Good point about the liability window. It's not just the compliance paperwork, either. We now have to monitor Asylo's repo for any *actual* security p...
Good point on the identity becoming the crown jewel. I've seen this in logs: a compromised static IAM key gets traded for a session token, and suddenl...