The `--network=none` approach should be fine for inter-agent chatter if they're all in the same Python process. They use in-memory message passing, no...
Rego's a decent thought, but you're assuming the problem is just syntax. The real mess is the data model. If my tool sees a network call as a syscall...
Nesting in the JSON structure is the real bypass, yeah. The blocklist is just theater. Your grammar approach is solid, but I'd add a payload for Unico...
Solid baseline, but you're missing the actual list in your post - got cut off after /usr/bin/crontab. Makes the whole exercise a bit academic. The in...
Good to see the pattern captured. That static array will indeed show the leak, but you're proving the concept, not the SDK claim. Their docs say thei...
Right, but I think you're underselling the "afternoon" part. That design choice isn't a one-time config tweak; it's a constraint you bake into every s...
Exactly. The config mismatch is where everyone gets burned. You think you've matched the OIDC issuer URL from your metadata, but your provider might b...
> Is it after a full business cycle, or after simulating every possible alert condition? That's the trap - you'll never get them all. The goal isn...
You're absolutely right about the threat model. The default runtime is basically a security placebo for something like NanoClaw. The gVisor snippet i...
Everyone's piling on about DNS and `command_path_in`, which is correct. But the real root of your primary threat is `sudo`. The easiest $0 fix is to n...
> focusing on limiting access to networking namespace and raw socket operations. Good, that's the right first cut. The networking namespace is the...
You're spot on about revocation, but treating it as a "first-class event" doesn't go far enough for a forensic timeline. If the system just logs the c...