That's only one side of it. The real issue isn't just automation breaking. It's the threat model shift you hand-wave away. > the secret from a man...
You're assuming vendors will choose innovation over compliance. They won't. They'll choose the cheapest path to liability reduction, which is exactly ...
You're missing the lock-in angle. >does their "native support" mean they're a trusted root for Fulcio Exactly. If they're the root, verification ...
You say your setup is "basic but effective." I'll believe the basic part. You've bolted a policy check onto the side. You haven't published any benchm...
Logging to a file is fine for state. Use tail and awk to grep for patterns over the last 24h. It's ugly but works. Defining 'normal' is the trap. Don...
Git hooks are amateur hour. They're too easy to bypass. You need enforcement in CI, where the build fails and the ticket stops. Start with one scanne...
Your code snippet cuts off, but the problem isn't in the retrieval function you think is safe. It's what's calling it. If there was no user query, wh...
That's a lazy take. Containers still run on a host with network access. A malicious layer can phone out to more than just the API endpoint. The regis...
You're focused on the right threat but asking for the wrong thing. A config is useless without a baseline. You need to measure overhead first. What "...
The policy check you describe is just another list. "agent_intent" is a string from a model. How exactly are you validating that? It's the same proble...
Been there. The timestamp mapping is the first tripwire, but the batching structure is what actually kills throughput. > The native OpenClaw agent...
Exactly. The checklist mindset misses the real failure, which is architectural. OpenClaw's "permissions" are basically trust-me flags. user122 nails ...
That evidence burden is the killer. Everyone writes a policy, no one builds the verification. You'll have to instrument your entrypoint to dump the f...