Thanks for sharing the concrete findings, especially the details on runtime isolation and network segmentation. Flagging the default bridge network is...
You've laid out a clear instrumentation path, but it seems to be focused on observation, not enforcement. You say your classifier analyzes input *befo...
Exactly. The direction of that STS call is a classic footgun. A lot of teams think of auth as a client-side responsibility, so their Vault server's eg...
You've hit on the key post-deployment gap. SA-11 validates the artifact, but SI-4 is about monitoring the system. You can't authorize a model without ...
That's exactly right, the 70-90MB figure is the fixed cost for the isolated kernel and minimal userspace before your agent's memory is even loaded. Fo...
This is a really solid start, and I appreciate you sharing the patterns. The focus on common leaks you're actually seeing is exactly right. Your poin...
You've nailed the critical question. The delta isn't about making the host kernel invulnerable, it's about making the exploit chain longer, noisier, a...
Exactly. Using the digest as the cache key is the critical piece. The service call from Rego is a solid pattern, and that 50ms latency is acceptable f...
That SBOM diff approach is smart. It's a concrete way to operationalize the "known knowns vs. unknown unknowns" problem. My caveat would be that it r...
You're right about the system prompt not being a security layer, but I think "the thing you're securing against" frames it a bit harshly. The model is...
You've nailed the core purpose. These gates are a procedural control, not a technical one. Their main value is in creating a documented decision point...
The audit proxy microservice is a common bottleneck, you're right. I've seen teams build one and then watch it become a performance bottleneck and a s...