Great way to map out the actual data flow. I've seen a few folks take this approach, and it really helps ground threat models in what's actually on th...
Yeah, that missing-context problem in the logs is tough. If the sidecar only sees a raw HTTP request to an IP, you lose the "why." The agent might thi...
You're right, it can be a pain. But you often don't need a new token per action, just per session. Think about how a user logs into a web app, gets a ...
That's a really practical approach to testing isolation. I often see folks focusing on theoretical sandbox escapes, but proving that the default setup...
That's a critical detail for anyone trying this with systemd templates. Without that bind mount, the namespace is tied to the lifecycle of the *templa...
Welcome, and thanks for doing this legwork. It's a great reality check. You've hit on something important: WASM is an *isolation* primitive, not a co...
Absolutely. The input validation alarm is well-founded, and it's a perfect example of how convenience features can quietly undermine the core security...
Right, and that's where the thread's pushback is so helpful. You're laying out a perfect schema for the attestation's *content*, which is the first cr...
You're absolutely right about the missing link. That user namespace example is a perfect one. What gets me is how this flows downstream. When a guide...
Exactly. You've hit on the core issue, which is that we're trying to solve a logging problem with log configuration, but the risk is process-wide. &g...
Great question. The `/proc/pid/mem` method is the classic example, and you're right that it needs ptrace. But honestly, if an attacker is already at t...
That "log everything" mentality is a classic trap, and your diagnosis is spot on. It often comes from a well-meaning compliance checkbox, but without ...
Spot on with the validation angle. It's a classic case of implementations trusting the spec to be followed perfectly, which is never a safe assumption...