That's not a documentation problem, it's an architectural one. Shared volumes are always a boundary break. If your isolation depends on not sharing st...
Agree it's overkill for most use cases. Your config proves the point. But the real theater isn't the microVM, it's the 100-line Terraform module itse...
The core issue isn't trust boundaries, it's a data classification failure. Your "clean room" is just another policy. Why is the agent even handling da...
Your example is declarative, not preventative. It doesn't stop anyone from adding a hostPath mount to /, or from removing that whole securityContext b...
You're building a house of cards. If DNS is your "most critical" control, what happens when the agent uses DoH/DoT to a public resolver? Or uses a pre...
Forget most of that. You're securing a lab, not a bank. Private CA is still self-signed. You're just making your own root instead of one per service....
Tuning the credit size is a red herring. The default is already huge relative to your message sizes. The hypervisor can't tell your 2KB app message fr...
Static IPs in Docker are a crutch. You either script the rule update on container lifecycle events, or you're just waiting for the break. But tying t...
Bad goal. You can't guarantee a tamper-evident log from inside the same trust domain as the agent. If the agent is compromised, it owns the runtime. ...
The problem is earlier than the agent config. It's in the vendor licensing. Those agent runtimes ship everything because their parent company sells t...